

# Two questions

- What is social complexity?
  - Quantifying the evolution of social complexity with the Seshat Databank
- What is collapse?
  - Building a Crisis/Recovery Database to test theories of state breakdown



# **SESHAT: Global History Databank**

The huge corpus of knowledge about past societies collectively possessed by academic historians is almost entirely in a form that is inaccessible to scientific analysis, stored in historians' brains or scattered over heterogeneous notes and publications. The huge potential of this knowledge for testing theories about political and economic development has been largely untapped.



## **Project goals:**

- Build a web of facts about past societies, connected along spatial, temporal, and conceptual dimensions
- Survey diversity in social evolutionary trajectories and identify general patterns
- Test and reject theories of sociocultural evolution




# World Sample-30



## Stratified sample


- by 10 world regions
- by the antiquity of centralized societies (early, intermediate, late)

#### A Global Sample of the Historical and Archaeological Record



Constructing a spatio-temporal dataset

At each sample point we code societies that occupied the area from the Neolithic to the Industrial Revolution. For example, Upper Egypt's polities range from the Badarian to the Ottoman Empire.





Tonky _	date	date
Badarian	-4400	-3801
Naqada IA-IIB	-3800	-3551
Naqada IIC-D	-3550	-3301
Dynasty 0 (Naqada IIIA-B)	-3300	-3101
Dynasty I (Naqada IIIC)	-3100	-2901
Dynasty II (Early Dynastic)	-2900	-2651
Classic Old Kingdom	-2650	-2351
ate Old Kingdom	-2350	-2151
First Intermediate	-2150	-2017
Middle Kingdom	-2016	-1700
Second Intermediate	-1720	-1567
New Kingdom-Thutmosid	-1550	-1294
New Kingdom-Ramesside	-1293	-1071
Ottoman Empire III	1683	1839

# Seshat Status, April 2019

- 34 NGAs
- 450 (quasi)polities
- 1500 variables
- ~300,000 Seshat records



#### **Social Scale**

Polity population
Polity territory
Capital population

### **Levels of hierarchy**

Admin levels
Military levels
Religious levels
Settlement hierarchy

# Social Complexity

#### Writing

Mnemonic Lists Records Script Alphabet Non-phonetic

#### **Texts**

Calendar
Sacred texts
Religious Lit
Practical Lit
Science Lit
History
Philosophy
Fiction

#### Infrastructure


Irrigation
Water supply
Market
Food storage
Roads
Bridges
Canals
Ports
Mines

#### **Government**

ProfOfficers
ProfSoldiers
ProfPriest
Bureaucrats
ExamSyst
MeritProm
GovtBuilding
Court
LegCode
Judges
Lawyers


#### Money


- 1. Articles
- 2. Tokens
- 3. Metals
- 4. Foreign coins
- 5. Indigenous coins
- 6. Paper currency




# Principal Component Analysis


PC4 PC1 PC2 PC3 PC5 Proportion of Variance 0.06 0.05 0.03 0.02 Cumulative Proportion 0.77 0.88 0.91 0.94 0.83








#### Instability Waves in France (Sorokin's Index)




# Recurrent waves of state breakdown and civil war




# SECULAR CYCLES Peter Turchin and Sergey A. Nefedov



# Cycles of well-being/low inequality – immiseration/high inequality



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


# The pessimistic view: "Death is the Great Leveler"

Inequality can decrease only by major, violent shocks:


- Mass-mobilization warfare
- Transformative revolution
- State failure/collapse
- Lethal pandemic


Note: I see inequality as a "proxy" (indicator) of social pressures undermining stability, rather than a direct cause of it



# A somewhat less pessimistic view

- Entry into crisis
   ("revolutionary
   situation") is relatively
   stereotypical
  - mass-mobilization, intraelite conflict, state fragility
- The exit from the crisis is hugely contingent
  - a "fan" of possible outcomes: from relatively mild to catastrophic





## Sample:

30 societies experiencing revolutionary situations (Europe, Russia, Middle East, India, China, US)

# Severity components of the outcome:

Population decline Population decline > 50% Lethal epidemic

Elite: massive downward mobility

Elite: dispossession or extermination Ruler executed or

assassinated
Transformative revolution

Civil war

Prolonged civil wars (>100 years)

Territorial fragmentation External conquest

## Forecast: growing political instability to the 2020s

OPINION NATURE|Vol 463|4 February 2010

# CORRESPONDENCE

Our decadal research predictions ('2020 visions' *Nature* **463,** 26-32; 2010) provoked ideas — and ire.

# Political instability may be a contributor in the coming decade

The next decade is likely to be a period of growing instability in the United States and western Europe, which could undermine the sort of scientific progress you describe in the Opinion collection of '2020 visions'.

Quantitative historical analysis reveals that complex human societies are affected by recurrent — and predictable — waves of political instability (P. Turchin

burgeoning public debt, can be addressed by making tax rates more progressive. And we should not expand our system of higher education beyond the ability of the economy to absorb university graduates. An excess of young people with advanced degrees has been one of the chief causes of instability in the past.

Peter Turchin Department of Ecology and Evolutionary Biology, University of Connecticut, Storrs, Connecticut 06269, USA e-mail: peter.turchin@uconn.edu therefore support development of as many technologies as possible. **Dietrich Leibfried National Institute** of Standards and Technology, Boulder, Colorado 80305, USA e-mail: dil@boulder.nist.gov

# Expanded view of universities would be more realistic

Tertiary education is poised for greater changes during the next decade than John Hennessey's vision implies (*Nature* **463**, 28–29;

for better representation.

Diversity among thought leaders is there if you look for it. You no longer have to look far among academics. Today, for example, women of vision are heads of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Harvard, Princeton and Brown universities; and the universities of Michigan, Pennsylvania and Cambridge.

Consider the Nobel prize. In 2009, it was awarded to five women (three of them scientists) and eight men, the narrowest gender gap since its inception.

The scientific community in